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I. INTRODUCTION

Courts have often debated what rights are fundamental in American
society. In this debate, courts have long held that the right to bear and raise children
must be considered one of an individual's basic fundamental rights.1 This right is so
basic that many parents take it for granted. The children who are raised by these
parents must be protected because children also have basic fundamental rights
recognized by the West Virginia Supreme Court.2 Children have "a right to
resolution of their life situations, to a basic level of nurturance, protection, and
security, and to a permanent placement."3
In an ideal society, the parental rights and the rights of the child would
always co-exist in harmony. Unfortunately, all too often they do not.4 The rights of
See id; see also State ex rel. W. Va. Dept. of Human Services v. Cheryl M., 356 S.E.2d 181, 183
(V. Va.1987); Syl. Pt 1,In re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129, 130 (W.Va. 1973) ('In the law concerning custody of
minor children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his
or her infant child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and
guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses ofthe West Virginia and United States Constitutions.").
See State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 470 S.E.2d. 205 (W.Va.1996).
2
3

Id1at 211-12.

4
See Catherine D. Munster, Child Maltreatment in West Virginia: The Comprehensive State
Remediation Model and the Court Improvement ProjectPart 1,12 W. VA. LAW. 18 (Aug. 1998). Munster
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children and the rights of parents inevitably come into conflict when children are
abused or neglected-the number of conflicts is astounding. 5 Because of an
inability to accurately predict what percentage of actual abuse and neglect cases are
being reported, the actual number of instances is likely even more overwhelming
than estimated. 6
Given this conflict, choices must be made by the courts. Often these
choices are the most difficult facing any tribunal. Too often, however, these
difficult decisions are avoided by judges.7 The ambivalence of judges in
confronting the issues of abuse and neglect, combined with the desire to put off
confrontation, leads to delay. 8 Moreover, courts and the participants in the process
often avoid confrontation and draw orders which appear to reflect more of a
compromise "than a determination of the best interests of the children." 9 The
avoidance is evident in the attitudes of judges, attorneys, and Department of Health
and Human Resources ("DHHR") workers towards the termination of parental
rights.10 This avoidance leads to delays in decision-making and delays in finding
permanent homes for abused and neglected children.11 Despite these delays, the
choice remains clear. In order to protect the right of children to be raised in a
environment, the parental rights of some individuals must be
nurturing, 1stable
2
terminated.
II. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN WEST VIRGINIA COURTS

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has tried to balance these
rights and find the proper equilibrium for children and their parents in those
situations deemed to constitute child abuse and neglect by the West Virginia
Legislature. 3 At the forefront, the Court has recognized that "[c]hild abuse and
notes that three million children in 1995 were reported to be abused or neglected. West Virginia, in fact,
ranked seventeenth in the country with 19,544 children reported as abused or neglected. Id.
5
See id.Over a seven year span in the late 1980's the number of sexually abused children rose by
83 percent. During this time the number of physically neglected children rose by 102 percent and the number
of emotionally neglected children rose by an amazing 333 percent. Id.
See id.
6
See Final Report and Recommendations of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Advisory
Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect (Nov. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Final Report].
7

8

See id. at21.

9

ld.at22.

10
See id. at 16. Sixty percent of circuit court judges, 70 percent of attorneys and 88.5 percent of
DHHR workers see parental right termination as the last resort, occurring only after every possibility has
failed over a long period of time. Id.
11
See Final Report, supranote 7, at 21.
12

See id.

An abused child is defined under W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3 (1999) as "a child whose health or
welfare is harmed or threatened by: (1) A parent, guardian or custodian who knowingly or intentionally
13
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neglect cases must be recognized as being among the highest priority for the courts'
attention. 4 In discussing the tension between parental rights and children's rights,
the Court has been equally clear. The law properly recognizes that natural parents
enjoy a great deal of protection in their parental rights.1 5 The Court has also
recognized that "one of the primary goals of the social service network and the
courts is to give aid to parents and children in an effort to reunite them."16 Despite
the recognition of these goals and of parental rights, West Virginia places its main
emphasis on the welfare of its children. 17 The State Supreme Court has clearly
indicated that "[a]lthough parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the
primary goal in cases involving abuse and neglect, as in all family law matters,
must be the health and welfare of the children.""' In fact, the best interest of the
child in child abuse and neglect cases is of paramount concern under West Virginia
law. 9 Understanding the significance of these competing rights, the West Virginia
Legislature has required that there be a showing of clear and convincing proof prior
to the termination of parental rights.20
Unfortunately, protection of the child's best interest is only a stated ideal
for West Virginia jurisprudence in child abuse and neglect cases. The reality in
West Virginia has often been a system of procedural delays and cases falling
through the cracks in the judicial system.2 1 The result has been that children too
often remain in "a limbo-like state" at a time in their lives when a nurturing,
permanent home is crucial. 2 The reality of this system wreaks havoc on the lives of
those children who depend on the legal system to assure the protection of their

inflicts, attempts to inflict or knowingly allows another person to inflict, physical injury or mental or
emotional injury, upon the child or another child in the home; or (2) Sexual abuse or sexual exploitation; or
(3) The sale or attempted sale of a child by a parent, guardian or custodian in violation of section sixteen [§
48-4-16], article four, chapter forty-eight of this code."
A neglected child is defined under W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3 (1999) as a child: "(A) Whose physical

or mental health is harmed or threatened by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child's parent,
guardian or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care or

education, when such refusal, failure or inability is not due primarily to a lack of financial means on the part
of the parent, guardian or custodian; or (B) Who is presently without necessary food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, education or supervision because of the disappearance or absence of the child's parent or
custodian."
Syl Pt. 1, In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365 (W. Va. 1991).
15

See id. at 375.

16

Id.

17

See In re Katie S., 479 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1996).

18

Id. at Syl Pt. 3.

See In re Jeffrey R.L., 435 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1993); see also In re Christina L., 460 S.E2d 692
(W.Va. 1995).
20
See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(c) (1999).
19

21

See In re CarlitaB., 408 S.E.2d at 374.

22

See ia at 375.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:477

rights.23 Children are facing "extended periods of time without any real resolution
for the child., 2 4 The results have had a disastrous effect on the lives of West
Virginia's abused and neglected children.25
III. WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT

The West Virginia Supreme Court has responded to the obvious need
resulting from the disastrous effects stated above. The Court ordered the creation of
the Advisory Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect in an effort to address the
procedural delays, lack of permanency, and havoc wreaked by the general
procedural inefficiencies. 26 The Committee worked to identify the barriers to
permanency which were present in West Virginia's child abuse and neglect cases. 27
The barriers that the Committee identified have often proven to be the significant
obstacles which leave children living adrift in abuse and neglect proceedings. 28
At the outset, the Advisory Committee found that those involved in the
process, including the attorneys and judges, were hindered by continuing confusion
in their efforts to balance the rights of parents and children.2 0 In their findings, the
Committee found that "too often uncertainty regarding the balancing of these rights
gives in to a well-entrenched presumption that the right of parents to improve
supercedes the right of children to permanency." 30 The Committee refuted this
presumption by relying on federal laws that declare that permanent homes must be
arranged in a reasonable time for children who are unable to be reunited with their
'3 2
families. 31 Such an arrangement is "critical to the child's emotional well-being.
The West Virginia Supreme Court has noted that courts are not expected to
"exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement" when it is apparent

23

See id.

24

Id. at 374.

25

See Munster, supranote 4.

26

See generally Final Report, supra note 7 (Nov. 13, 1995) (recognizing 'that the West Virginia

Supreme Court first ordered the creation of the advisory committee in Jennifer A. v. Burgess, No. 21009 (July
16, 1993) and next broadened the mission of the committee in State ex rel. S.C. v. Chafin, 444 S.E.2d 62 (W.
Va. 1994)).
27
See Final Report, supra note 7, at I.
28

29

See id. at 1-2.
See id.at 16.

30

Id.at 16.

See id.at 16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 427(a)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B); and
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)).
32
Final Report, supra note 7, at 18.
31
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that the welfare of the child will be threatened.33
In its findings, the Committee also found that delays in the process were
preventing the achievement of permanency for children who were abused or
neglected.34 The Committee concentrated on the improper use of improvement
periods in child neglect and abuse proceedings.3 5 The Committee emphasized that
the time spent in pre-adjudicatory improvement periods was often wasted time.3 It
further indicated a general ineffectiveness of pre-adjudicatory improvement periods
in benefiting the abused or neglected child.3 7 The Committee noted that "up to a
year can be wasted while family members go through the motions of attending
therapy and other programs but do not really benefit from them since no final
determination of the actual nature of the problems has been made., 38 In fact, the
Committee found such misuse of the then-existing twelve month pre-adjudicatory
improvement periods that it recommended their total elimination from child abuse
and neglect proceedings. 39 In the alternative, the Committee suggested that at the
very least the periods should be shortened to minimize the delay caused by them.4"
The suggested revisions also included a shift in the burden for those parents who
requested improvement periods. 41 When analyzing post-adjudicatory improvement
periods, the Advisory Committee noted that too often the improvement periods are
repeatedly extended for months, or even years, which greatly increases the time
available to parents for improvement.42 Parental improvement is certainly
beneficial if fully achieved. However, extending the improvement period for years
"unquestionably has a detrimental impact upon the affected child's sense of
43
security and place, and can result in lost opportunities for permanent placement.
The analysis and recommendations of the Advisory Committee concerning
the parental improvement periods were well received by the Court, as well as the
Legislature. In 1996, the West Virginia Legislature amended the statutes dealing
See Syl Pt. 3, In re Darla B., 331 S.E.2d 868 (W. Va.1985); see also West Virginia DHHR ex reL
McClure v. Daniel B., 507 S.E.2d 132 (W.Va. 1998).
33

34

See Final Report, supra note 7, at 21.

35

See id The Committee found barriers in both the inappropriate and excessive use of preadjudicatory improvements periods and noted that prolonged post-adjudicatory improvement periods decrease

the likelihood of finding permanency for abused and neglected children.
36
See id at 24 (noting that the "pre-adjudicatory improvement period places 'the cart before the
horse' in that it gives the parent(s) up to twelve months to work towards goals before the facts of the case
have been determined.").
37

See id.

38

Id. at 24.

39

See Final Report, supra note 7, at 25.

40

See id. at 26.

41

See id.

42

See id at31.

43

Id.
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with child abuse and neglect to reflect the revisions suggested for the improvement
periods allowed under West Virginia law.44 Furthermore, the West Virginia
Supreme Court adopted new Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings, which went into effect on January 1, 1997. s This article will focus on
these changes in the improvement period process, the result of these changes, and
the deplorable circumstances which arose prior to these changes. 6 This article also
considers recent revisions to federal law which proves helpful in examining the
focus and success West Virginia lawmakers had in improving child abuse and
neglect proceedings.
IV. IMPROVEMENT PERIODS UNDER WEST VIRGINIA LAW

Improvement periods have long been a part of child abuse and neglect
proceedings under West Virginia law. The child abuse and neglect statutes have
always considered that improvement periods provided by the court would be used
to address the problems which might otherwise lead to the termination of parental
rights.4 These periods have always been used to facilitate reunification when it is
in the best interests of the children involved.48
A.

Improvement PeriodsPriorto 1996

Prior to the legislative and judicial action of 1996, the availability of
improvement periods in parental termination proceedings was nearly universal.49 In
many ways, the Court had considered the availability of improvement periods as a
statutory entitlement for parents in such proceedings.50 The statutory language

required that the court "shall allow one such improvement period unless it finds
compelling circumstances to justify a denial thereof .... '
44

See H.B. 4138, 72nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 1996) (becoming effective law under W. VA.

CODE § 49-6-1 et seq. on July 1, 1996).
45

See generally W. VA. R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. (2000).

46

Many other reforms of the child abuse and neglect proceedings process have been undertaken in

addition to changes in the improvement period procedure. See Munster, supra note 4. This article will restrict
its focus, however, to the reform of improvement periods and its effect on achieving the goal of safe and
permanent homes for children in a timely fashion.
See Daniel L. McCarthy, Anticipated Effects of New ProceduralRules and Statutory Changes in
Abuse and Neglect Cases, 10 W. VA. LAW. 14, 14 (July 1997).
47

48

See State ex rel. Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 212.

49

See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(b) (1995). A court shall allow an improvement period "unless it finds

compelling circumstances to justify denial thereof...."Id.
50
See Cheryl M., 356 S.E.2d at 184 (citing State v. Scritchfield, 280 S.E.2d 315, 321 (W. Va. 1981)
("Clearly, the statute presumes the entitlement of a parent to an opportunity to ameliorate the conditions or
circumstances upon which a child neglect or abuse proceeding is based.")).
51

W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(b) (1995).
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Prior to a final hearing, improvement periods under the prior statutory
language were allowed for "three to twelve months in order to remedy the
circumstances or alleged circumstances" 52 West Virginia law also provided an
improvement period "not to exceed twelve months" after a finding of abuse or
neglect. 53 For the post-adjudicatory improvement periods, the statutory language
4
mandated that only one such improvement period would be granted.
B.

Improvement PeriodsFollowingthe 1996Amendments andAdditions

Following the Advisory Committee recommendations, the West Virginia
Legislature made significant changes to W.Va. Code Section 49-6-1 et seq.55 The
primary effect of the new statutory language is to strictly limit the discretion of
courts in granting improvement periods and to impose structure and time limits on
those improvement periods that are granted.Furthermore, the newly enacted Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings aid courts in applying these new statutory standards.' 7 The
statutory language, court decisions and rules rely on several essential principles. 58
First, they rely on the understanding that the purpose of these proceedings is to
assure safety for children and the belief that children who are not living in a
permanent home are not safe.5 9 The new law recognizes the reality that an
"[e]xtended period of time in legal limbo is a form of child abuse and neglect." '
Second, the new statutory provisions and rules recognize that effective child abuse
and neglect remedies require community solutions implemented with a
coordinated, team-like approach. 61
In applying these principles, the first significant change in the law is the
standard that parents must show in order to actually be granted an improvement

52

See id.

53

See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(c) (1995).

54

See id.

55

See H.B. 4138, 72nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1996) (becoming effective law under W. VA.

CODE § 49-6-1 et seq. on July 1, 1996). The Legislature amended and reenacted the aforementioned sections

two and five and amended those articles by adding article twelve of chapter forty-nine to West Virginia's
statutory code. See id2

See Brenda Waugh, Legislative Action Affects Children in West Virginia, 9 W. VA. LAW. 22, 22
(July 1996); see also W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12 (1999).
57
See W. VA. R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. §§ 23, 37-38 (2000).
5

See generally Catherine D. Munster, Update on West Virginia's Law of Child Abuse and Neglect
and the Role ofAdvocates, West Virginia CLE (1998).
58

59

See id at 1.

60

Id

61

See id.
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period prior to the termination of parental rights.62 This change arose directly from
the Advisory Committee's recommendations.6 3 West Virginia's statutory language
now requires that the parent demonstrate, "by clear and convincing evidence," that
he or she "is likely to fully participate in the improvement period." Furthermore,
the parent or guardian must show that he or she has "not previously been granted
any improvement period" or, in the alternative, must demonstrate that "since the
initial improvement period" he or she "has experienced a substantial change in
circumstances." 65 The parent or guardian seeking an additional improvement period
must further demonstrate that as a result of a substantial change of circumstances,
he or she "is likely to fully participate in a further improvement period."
Other changes were made to the time limitations placed on all types of
improvement periods. One example is that for pre-adjudicatory improvement
periods, the statute allows courts to grant an improvement period "not to exceed
three months. 67 Furthermore, there are no extensions for pre-adjudicatory
improvement periods available to courts under the new statute.6 In allowing postadjudicatory improvement periods, West Virginia law now permits a court to grant
"an improvement period of a period not to exceed six months."6 9 Furthermore, the
statutory language also allows courts to "grant an improvement period not to
exceed six months as a disposition., 70 Unlike pre-adjudicatory improvement
periods, West Virginia law allows post-adjudicatory and dispositional improvement
periods to be extended for "a period not to exceed three months." 7' This extension
is allowed only when three conditions are met.72 First, the court must find that the
parent has "substantially complied with the terms of the improvement period. 73
Second, the court also must find that "continuation of the improvement period will
62

See Final Report, supranote 7, at 26.

63

See id.(stating "[t]he Revisions should include: a) shifting the burden of proof to obtain a pre-

adjudicatory improvement period so as to require the parent(s) to show, by clear and convincing evidence,
compelling reasons to justify why an improvement period should be granted.').
64
W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(a)(2) (1999) (for pre-adjudicatory improvement periods); W. VA. CODE §
49-6-12(b)(2) (1999) (for post-adjudicatory improvement periods) and W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(c)(2) (1999)
(for post-dispositional improvement periods). W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12 (1999) is a completely new section
which amends the prior statutory language dealing with improvement periods under W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2
(1999).
65
W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(b)(4), (c)(4) (1999).
66

W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(b)(4) (1999).

67

W. VA. CODE §

68

See Munster, supranote 58; see also W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12 (1999).

69

W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(b) (1999).

70

W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(c) (1999).

71

W. VA. CODE

72

See id.

73

Id.

49-6-12(a) (1999).

§ 49-6-12(g) (1999).
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not substantially impair the ability... to permanently place the child." 74 Finally, if
these conditions are met and the extension is "otherwise consistent with the best
interest of the child," the court is free to issue the three-month extension. 75 It was
quickly recognized that the new enactments establish a "clear statutory mandate" to
limit improvement periods 7 6
Significantly, the current statutory language and rules have included a
mandatory structure for supervision of the process. If a motion for an improvement
period is granted, the law requires the Department of Health and Human Resources,
with input from a multi-disciplinary treatment team, to submit a "family case plan"
within thirty days of such a ruling 7 The requirements for such a plan are legislated
by statute.78 The new law and rules require that there be mandatory judicial reviews
of the improvement period either within sixty or ninety days.79
V. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE CASE OFAMYM.8 0

The need for change was obvious as evidenced by the many cases that can
be cited as prime examples of failures in the system. Specifically, the case of Amy
M highlights the necessity of the recent efforts at bettering the system.
74
75

Id
I

76
See State ex rel.Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 212; see also West Virginia DHHR ex rel McClure, 507
S.E.2d at 135.
77
See W. VA. R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. 23(a), 37 (2000); see also W. VA. CODE § 49-612(a)(4), (b)(5), (c)(5) (1999).
78
See W. VA. CODE § 49-6D-3(1999); see also W. VA. R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. 23(a), 37
(2000); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12(a)(4), (b)(5), (c)(5) (1999). W. VA. CODE § 49-6D-3 provides that all family
case plans must contain:

(1) A listing of specific, measurable, realistic goals to be achieved; (2) An arrangement
of goals into an order of priority; (3) A listing of the problems that will be addressed by
each goal; (4) A specific description of how the assigned caseworker or caseworkers and
the abusing parent, guardian or custodian will achieve each goal; (5) A description of
the departmental and community resources to be used in implementing the proposed
actions and services; (6) A list of the services . . . which will be provided; (7) Time
targets for the achievement of goals or portions of goals; (8) An assignment of tasks to
the abusing or neglecting parent, guardian or custodian, to the caseworker or
caseworkers and to other participants in the planning process; and (9) A designation of
when and how often tasks will be performed; and (10) The safety of the placement of the
child and plans for returning the child safely home.
See W. VA. R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. 23(b), 37 (2000); see also W. VA. CODE § 49-612(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(3) (1999). The rules and statutory provisions require that the court granting the period
shall order "a hearing be held to review the matter within sixty days of the granting of the improvement
79

period or... within ninety days" if the court orders "the department to submit a report as to the respondents

progress in the improvement period within sixty days of the order granting the improvement period." W. VA.
R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. 23(b), 37 (2000).
so
See State ex rel.Amy M. v. Kaufman, 470 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1996).
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Betty Jo B., age twenty-three, and Shane B. were the mutual parents of
four, and possibly five, of Betty Jo's children, who ranged in age from two to
seven.81 On February 1, 1994, police responded to a call from an individual stating
that "he was caring for two of the children and refused to do so any longer., 82 The
police ascertained that Betty Jo had left the children with this individual a day
earlier, telling him to watch the children while she went to cash a check.8 Upon
arriving at the children's home, the police found "conditions they described as
'beyond belief,""' and the police took emergency custody of the children.m The
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources had previously
documented several incidents of intervention dating back nearly four years.'
Ten days later, and six days after abuse and neglect petitions were filed,
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County granted a pre-adjudicatory improvement
period.87 The Court granted the motion for an improvement period to run from
February 10, 1994 to May 10, 1994.88 Subsequently, on May 27, 1994, a status
review was held.8 9 The Court observed that the parents had consistently complied
with the order, and the Circuit Court thereby extended the improvement period for

81

See id. at 208.

82

Id.

83

See id.

84

Id. Police found conditions which included:
human excrement in the toilet, all over a potty chair and smeared on the walls; broken
glass, trash, food, and dirty diapers strewn throughout the house; a filthy bathroom;
urine-stained beds with no sheets; and a large kitchen knife on the bedroom floor. The
children, then aged eight months to five years, had no food, and what little clothing they
had was extremely dirty. All were badly infested with head lice, and ill to varying
degrees.

Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 208.
85
See id.
See id. Furthermore, incidents in which relatives and neighbors had taken the children to the
hospital posing as Betty Jo B. were noted. See id. Conditions further revealed that "the older children were
sleeping on a box on the floor, while the infant twins, who had no cribs, slept in a car seat and a baby swing."
Id. at 208-09. There were further "reports of numerous abandonments for days at a time with adequate
provision for food, diapers, or supervision of the children." State ex rel. Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 209. In July
1993, a child protective worker testified to "deplorable living conditions.., including no beds, no food, ill
children, and generally unsanitary conditions." Id. A nurse examining Amy M. in November 1993 testified to
an incident in which "the child had a urinary tract infection so severe that it had the potential for serious longterm consequences." Id. Incredibly, the nurse further testified that she was accompanied to the hospital by a
mother "who was so obviously intoxicated that the nurse felt it necessary to call a neighbor and a cab just to
get the child home safely." Id.
86

87

See id.

88

See Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 209. The order granted temporary custody to DHHR, and a family

case plan was ordered as well as a psychological evaluation, substance abuse evaluations, parenting classes
and medical and psychological evaluations for all the children. See id.
89

See id.
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an additional six months.' Near the end of this second improvement period, the
court noted that the parents' progress in their effort toward reunification had
deteriorated.91 Despite this deterioration, the Court once again extended the
improvement period. 92 Over four months later, Court records indicate that yet
another improvement period extension was granted.93 All of these extensions
occurred prior to any adjudication of abuse or neglect of the children. 94 Meanwhile,
the children remained in the custody of the Department of Health and Human
Resources. 95 Finally, in April, 1995, over one year after the initial improvement
period was granted, an overnight visit in which Betty Jo B. once again
demonstrated her inability to care for her children, led to a motioi to schedule
adjudication on the matter.'e
Four months later, on August 29, 1995, the first adjudicatory hearing on
child abuse and neglectwas held.97 At this time, no ruling was made on the issue of
abuse and neglect.9s Furthermore, there was no termination of the improvement
period. 99 On November 20, 1995, "fully one year and nine months after the children
were removed from the home, and having exhausted nearly every possibility of
parent education and rehabilitation with little or no improvement apparent on the
record, the court made a finding of neglect" under West Virginia law.o° On the
very same day, the judge granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period without
time limit or terms and conditions. 10 1 One month later, the Court issued an order
which granted a ninety-day improvement period which began retroactively from the

90

See id

See id The evidence indicated that the parents were not attending parenting classes. See State ex
rel. Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 209. It further showed that they had not visited the kids for over four months. See
id. Other evidence indicated that Betty Jo B. took her two year-old and four year-old to a bar while one of the
girls "went out on her own, searching for her mother in the bars." Id. Moreover, two of the children returned
from one unsupervised visit with "unexplained knots on their heads." Id.
See id. at 210. (noting that while the circuit court had adequately monitored the case to that point,
92
91

the court lapsed into continuing the improvement period when no such improvement period was called for).
9a3
See Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 210. This extension came over one year after the initial improvement
period was granted in an order dated March 25, 1995. See id.
94

See id.

95

See id

96

See id

97

See Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 210.
See id.

98

See id The improvement period which had been in effect since February 10, 1994, appeared to be
"open-ended" and illustrated the difficulty which was created by continuing improvement periods beyond
their statutory limits. Id.
Id. at211.
100
99

See Amy M., 470 S.E.2d at 210. This order was entered "over the vehement objection of both the
State and the guardian ad litem." Id.
101
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November hearing date.10 2
At that time, a writ of prohibition was filed with the State Supreme Court.
The State Supreme Court found that a writ of prohibition was, indeed, appropriate
in the case because the Circuit Court had violated the clear statutory mandate to
limit the extent and duration of improvement periods. 0 3 Recognizing "the tendency
of cases such as these to fall through the cracks," the State Supreme Court found
that the procedural delays and decisions to "further postpone any permanency
decision with regard to these children would be unconscionable."' 04 In doing so, the
Court granted the writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court from enforcing its
order of an additional improvement period for Betty Jo B.
VI. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE NEW IMPROVEMENT PERIODS

The new statutory and procedural rules mirror many of the
recommendations set out by the West Virginia Advisory Committee on Child
Abuse and Neglect. 05 Despite the reliance on many of the Advisory Committee's
findings, parties have differed in their opinions on the effects of these changes.' 6
The changes in the improvement periods are in some ways very profound and, in
others, seem simply to be a slight modification. In any respect, they arise from an
effort to address many of the problems present in West Virginia child abuse and
neglect cases prior to their enactment. In every way, the laws are designed to secure
the safety of the child by placing them more quickly in a permanent home.107 What
follows is a discussion of the effects of some of the changes, the reasoning, and
purpose behind these changes.
This discussion begins with the change in the standard that is required to
be met before an improvement period will even be granted. By shifting the burden
from the petitioner, usually the DHHR, to the parents, the legislature has essentially
required parents to demonstrate that an improvement period would be beneficial. In
the past, the DHHR had the burden of proving that there was a compelling need to
deny the improvement period. Today, however, parents must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that they will likely fully participate in the terms and
conditions of the period. To accomplish this task, parents must acknowledge that
there is an abuse and neglect problem before an improvement period will be
granted because without acknowledgement, this problem is untreatable.'0o
102

See id.

103

See id. (noting this intention even under the statutory provisions in effect prior to 1996).

104

Id. at 213. Noting this unconscionability, the Court pointed out that "five young children have

lived in foster care limbo since February 1, 1994, more than two years of their young lives."
105
See generally Final Report, supranote 7.
106

See Ronald E. Wilson, I Respectfully Dissent, 10 W. VA. LAW. 14 (Nov. 1996).

107

See Munster, supra note 58, at 1.

108

See id. at 6; see also West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources v. Doris S., 475 S.E.2d
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Additionally, parental entitlement to these improvement periods is no longer the
case.1"o This change signifies an important reform in the law by demonstrating to
parents that they must be serious about improving themselves as parents before
they will be granted an improvement period. It further serves the purpose of
eliminating those improvement periods that clearly have no chance of successfully
reuniting children with their abusing parents.
Under the prior law, improvement periods were all too often granted, and
were even granted when there was little chance of success and when such periods
were not in the best interests of the child. 110 Historically, only in the most egregious
cases of abuse and neglect were parents denied an improvement period,"' and even
respondents in cases of flagrant and untreatable abuse and neglect were often given
repeated improvement periods. 112 Today, improvement periods are allowed only in
those cases in which the parents show a willingness to acknowledge their problems
and actually comply with all of the terms and conditions to remediate the
circumstances giving rise to the abuse and neglect.113
This change is a step forward to protect children who would otherwise
' 14
endure a potentially devastating, extended period of time in "legal limbo." "
Participants in child abuse and neglect proceedings must realize that parental rights
are not so inalienable as to allow parents to ignore their children's right to a safe
and nurturing home.115 These changes advance the goals and principles set forth by
the Legislature and the Court to provide a safe and permanent home for children in
a fair and timely fashion. 16
The goal of a timely and efficient disposition in placing children in
permanent homes is forwarded by the implementation of a time-structured process.
The current law significantly structures the time within the improvement period to
insure that the court, as well as the agencies involved, are active in evaluating the
parental progress and protecting the child's rights.' 1 7 In doing so, the law requires
the proceedings to develop in the timely manner they deserve.11 This aspect of the
865 (v. Va. 1996).
See State ex rel. Virginia M. v. Virgil Eugene S., 475 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1996) ([R]ather than
109
presuming the entitlement of a parent to an improvement period ....the law now places on the parent the
burden ofproof regarding whether an improvement period is appropriate.").
See Final Report, supra note 7, at 24.
110
ill
112

See id.
See generally Amy M., 470 S.E.2d 205.

113

See Munster, supra note 58.

114

See McCarthy, supra note 47, at 15.

115

Compare Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 with Amy M., 470 S.E.2d 205.

116

See Margaret Workman, Supreme Court Page, 9 W. VA. LAW 7 (Dec. 1997).

117

See W.VA. CODE § 49-6-12 (1999); see also W. VA. R.P ABUSE& NEGLECT PROc. 23 and 37.

See State v. Julie G., 50G S.E.2d 877, 881 (W. Va. 1997) The trial court "regularly and frequently
reviewed Julie's progress and amended her case plan, without delay, when various needs became apparent"
118
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in
revised law and new rules "assure the Court's active 'hands on' involvement
1 19
each case from its initiation until permanent placement is consummated."
The issue that raises the most controversy is the time limitations placed on
the lengths of the various improvement periods. Under current law, courts lose the
discretion to extend improvement periods after the statutory periods and extensions
have run. 120 The result is a system of mandatory, accelerated time periods in which
parents must meet the goals of the improvement period or face termination of their
parental rights. 21 This process may have no detrimental effect in those cases in
which the improvement periods have shown that termination of parental rights is
the only viable option. Few cases, however, are that clear cut.122 Indeed, "more
often cases fall in a 'gray' area where parents recognize at least some of their
problems and are willing to accept services in an effort to rectify the circumstances
giving rise to the abuse and/or neglect. 1 23 It is under these conditions that courts
may have difficulty applying the present provisions. Parents who have made some
progress toward the goals outlined in the family case plan may not have achieved
enough progress prior to the expiration of the mandatory limits to retain their
parental rights. Under the current law, parents must be able to demonstrate, by the
end of a span of twenty-one months, that they have progressed enough so that the
safety of the child would be assured under reunification.124 Thus, one of the
perceived "down sides" of the new law arises out of the rigid requirement placed on
judges hearing these cases that they must move to alternative permanency plans for
the child if the parents cannot sufficiently improve in the twenty-one month time
period. 2 s
Judges face these mandatory requirements throughout the proceedings.
Critics argue that trial judges have the "responsibility to utilize available resources
to make every effort to keep families together., 126 Most judges would argue that
they are the ones who are in the best position to protect the rights of abused and
neglected children. 27 It is argued that, under current law, this ability is taken away

In doing so the Supreme Court noted that the "court truly handled this case with the type of priority that child
abuse and neglect cases deserve, but of which they are all too often deprived." Id.
119
See McCarthy, supra note 47; see also W. VA. R.P. ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. 6 (stating that
"[e]ach civil protection proceeding shall be maintained on the court's docket until permanent placement of the
child has been achieved.")
120
See McCarthy, supra note 47.
121

See id.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 14.

124

See id.

125

See Wilson, supranote 106.

126

Id. at 14.

127

See id.
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from trial judges.128 These same critics note that finite improvement periods require
judges to concentrate, not on the specific problems unique
1 29to each case, but rather,
the calendar in an effort to meet the mandated time limits.
The system that results from the revisions of 1996, however, places the
emphasis where it belongs. Proceedings today focus on the child's right to
permanency. The structure of the current proceedings recognizes the child's right to
secure a safe home within a reasonable time.
Critics who oppose the new changes also argue that the new time limits are
simply not long enough. 130 The critics ignore, however, the time requirements
mandated by federal law following the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
("ASFA") and the strict compliance required by the ASFA as a condition to the
continued receipt of federal funds.13' These accelerated time periods may have a
significant impact on the outcome of child abuse and neglect proceedings.132 Most
significant is the potential for an increased number of terminations. 33
These outcomes are not as devastating as they appear. It should be noted
that the new statutes allow for a total of twenty-one months, including extensions,
in which parents are granted time to improve. 4 Certainly, twenty-one months is
not a greatly extended period of time. However, given that often this time period is
imposed for the benefit of children who may not even be twenty-one months old,
the time limit should not be considered so imposing. It must be observed "that
because children have a 'sense of time' much shorter than that of adults, they can
suffer grievously from brief periods of uncertainty. ' 1as Considering the welfare of
abused and neglected children who are under two years old, the new time
restrictions are not too short. West Virginia has set forth a policy in child abuse and
neglect cases which places the child's welfare at the forefront. Therefore, while the
results may "seem drastic on first blush," they really serve the "ultimate goal of
128

repudiating post-adjudicatory improvement periods in excess of nine
Id at 14 (stating that "[i]n

months, the movers and shakers now calling the shots in this gut-wrenching work have struck a fatal blow to
child termination decisions based upon the divergent facts unique to each case.").
129

See id.

130

Wilson, supra note 106, at 15. Focusing primarily on post-adjudicatory improvement periods,

Judge Ronald E. Wilson said that "nine months is not enough time to solve the multiple problems afflicting
most of these troubled households." Id.

131

See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P. L. No 105-89; see also Emestine Steward Gray,

The Adoption andSafe FamiliesAct of 1997,46LA. BJ. 477 (1999).
See McCarthy, supra note 47.

132

133

See id at 14-5 (noting that "when the maximum time allowable for improvement periods has

expired .... then the Court has no further discretion to give the parents more time to improve, but must

instead move to assure the child a safe and permanent home elsewhere. Thus it is likely that Courts will find
that utilizing some form of alternative disposition, probably termination may become more commonplace.
Assuming that family reunification in some form is not utilized, then the options become termination.., or
some permanent out-of-home placement.").
134

See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-12 (1999).

135

See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise andFailure of the Adoption

andSafe FamiliesAct of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 655 (1999).
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assuring that children are placed in safe and permanent homes, within a reasonable
period of time, rather than spending their most formative years in 'legal limbo.""'13
It is too early to determine if the reality has changed to more closely mirror
the ideal. However, the aspirational view of placing the child's best interest as the
paramount concern that the Legislature and Courts touted prior to 1996 is now
becoming more of the reality. The structure and process now lend themselves to
better protection of the health and welfare of children. At least under the current
statutory scheme, the reality of the structure and process no longer differ from the
aspirational goals of those involved in protecting the child's welfare.
VII. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD WELFARE LAW AT THE
FEDERAL LEVEL
Developments in child welfare law have occurred at the federal level, as
well as in West Virginia. Many of the same criticisms of West Virginia's child
welfare laws were also present at a national level. In all jurisdictions, child welfare
laws must be balanced to insure the protection of children's rights. Whether it be in
West Virginia or at the federal level, it is widely recognized that the state has long
been held as the "ultimate protector of children."137 It is this duty to protect children
that seemed to be failing at all levels of child welfare law. In fact, federal
lawmakers recognized many of the same concerns that.the West Virginia Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect pinpointed in West
Virginia. As a result of this recognition, federal lawmakers took steps to reform the
child welfare system, which mirrored the effort in West Virginia in many respects.
Just one year after the West Virginia legislature enacted many of the
reforms in improvement periods and child welfare law discussed earlier, the 105t
Congress overwhelmingly recognized that a "child's health and safety shall be the
paramount concern" when dealing with children facing separation from their
parentsY'8 On November 19, 1997, President Clinton signed the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997. At that time it was clear that the fundamental principle of the
Act was "to 'reform the child welfare system to work better for the children it
serves, to put their health and safety first' in all efforts to achieve reunification or
permanent placement., 13 9 Likewise, the Adoption and Safe Families Act recognizes
that "foster care is temporary.' 140
This recognition gradually developed after the enactment of the Adoption

136

See McCarthy, supra note 47, at 15.

137

See Gray, supranote 13 1, at 477.

138

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111. Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)).

139

See Gray, supra note 131, at 478 (citing remarks by the President and First Lady at the Adoption

Bill signing, the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Nov. 19, 1997).
140
Id. at 478.
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and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA"). 14' During the 1970's there was a
growing awareness of problems in foster care systems nationwide. A concept
known as "foster care drift" developed in recognition of the fact that children, who
were often removed from their parents, were seldom reunited, but instead, "drifted"
from one temporary placement to another. These children experienced "[e]xtended
periods in temporary care" as they were left in foster care for years while agencies
tried to rehabilitate their abusive parents.14 2 In 1980, Congress attempted to
alleviate this problem by reducing this "removal and providing permanency for
children. 143
In doing so, the AACWA implemented hearings for children who had been
removed to "determine whether the child welfare agency made reasonable efforts to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal," as well as insure return of the child to
the home.'" The results were horrific. Many children in the system lacked any
semblance of a permanent home. Instead, they were "set adrift . . . bouncing
between placements."' 45 Worse yet, there were children whose lives were
"sacrificed for the sake of preserving the family." 146 Efforts to reunify at all costs
147
too often led to children who were savagely beaten, prostituted or even killed.
Those viewing the child welfare system quickly determined that "reasonable
efforts" had become unreasonable. Children's lives were in danger because the
system placed too much emphasis on reuniting families and the rights of parents.
In the face of this dismal reality, the ASFA was established with two
guiding principles developed to address concerns for child safety and foster care
drift. First, "the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern.' 4 8
Second, the ASFA's guiding principles makes clear "that children deserve
nurturing and permanent homes."' 49
Supported by these basic principles, the ASFA addresses the concerns of
child safety and foster care drift in several ways. These provisions are aimed "to
prevent the dangerous reunification efforts" which were all too often present."5 At
the outset, the ASFA attempts to protect child safety by clarifying the "reasonable
efforts" requirement in child welfare actions by establishing child safety and
141
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,42 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq.
and §§ 670 et seq.
142
See Gray,supra note 131, at 477.
143

Id. at 478.

144

let

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

See Gordon, supranote 135, at 647.

148

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)).

149

Mimi Laver, Implementing ASFA: A Challengefor Agency Attorneys, 17 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAcr.

1, 1(1998).
150
See Gordon, supra note 129, at 650.
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permanence as the "pre-eminent considerations" in defining what is a reasonable
effort. 61 The ASFA indicates that when continuing reasonable efforts to reunify are
"determined to be inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, reasonable
efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the
permanency plan."1 52 Furthermore, the ASFA allows efforts to find alternative
placement to "be made concurrently with reasonable efforts" to reunite families.'53
Congress went further and indicated certain circumstances in which reasonable
efforts to reunify would not be required. These circumstances include parents who
have "subjected the child to aggravated circumstances,"1 54 parents who have
committed murder, 155 committed manslaughter,1 5 or committed a "felony assault
1S7
that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent."
Reasonable efforts to reunify also are not required in cases in which "the parental
rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily. '1
The ASFA also makes changes to accelerate placements to eliminate foster
care drift. To begin with, the new law follows up the exceptions to reasonable
efforts to reunify by insuring that when such efforts are not required, "a
permanency hearing shall be held within 30 days" after such a determination. 59
Efforts must be made "to place the child in a timely manner," as well as "finalize
the permanent placement of the child., 160 The Act also "requires timely decision
making for permanency" in greatly compressed time frames. 161 The ASFA modifies
and accelerates permanency hearings by requiring that such hearing be held within
twelve months of removal instead of eighteen months of removal.162 The Act also
mandates that such6 3 a hearing cannot produce long-term foster care without a
compelling reason.
To further expedite the process, the ASFA allows efforts to find alternative
placement to "be made concurrently with reasonable efforts" to reunite families.16

152

See Gray, supranote 131, at 479.
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(1 5)(C)).

153

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C.§ 671(a)(15)(F)).

154

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(D)(i)).

155

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(1)).

155

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(II)).

157

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)( 15)(d)(ii)(IV)).

158

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2117 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(D)(iii)).

159

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2117 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i)).

150

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2117 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii)).

161

See Gray, supra note 131, at 478.

162

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115,2128 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(2)).

163

See Gordon, supra note 135, at 651.

164

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115,2117 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F)).

151
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Another provision of the Act aims to end foster care drift by requiring the
termination of parental rights in the case of any child who has been in foster care
for "15 of the most recent 22 months."'r'
As with the changes in improvement periods under West Virginia law, the
ASFA has received both high praise and a certain amount of skepticism. There are
those who claim the ASFA "does nothing short of reverse 17 years of misguided
child welfare policy."'"6 This claim is not completely accurate. The ASFA is
certainly not perfect law. However, few legislative enactments, if any, can ever be
deemed as a perfect resolution.
The ASFA will likely not cure all the ills of a child welfare system that is
fraught with many conflicting actors and influences. There may be areas in which
parents' interests still hold too much control in the child welfare agencies'
decision-making. 167 The disparity in opinion, however, lies in the details. As with
the changes made to improvement periods by the West Virginia lawmakers, the
ASFA does emphasize the appropriate principles.
Like the changes in West Virginia, the ASFA takes aspirational goals and
aims to make these goals a reality. The renewed focus on child safety is a first step.
The provisions direct that reasonable efforts to reunify must be truly reasonable. A
more strict clarification of when such reasonable efforts are necessary takes many
endangered children from those environments which offer the danger. Moreover,
the shortened time frame for permanency planning requires all parties involved in
the process to focus on placing children in a permanent, appropriate settings, in a
timely fashion. There are sure to be occasions in which children suffer from
inadequate protection or extended periods of temporary care. However, these
occasions will be fewer and farther between following the enactment of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.
VIII. CONCLUSION

West Virginia is not alone. Cases of abuse and neglect by parents are all
too common. Instances of inadequate proceedings and child protective services are
also too often seen in child welfare systems across the country. Likewise, the facts
of the Amy M. case are, unfortunately, not unique. The process too often leaves
children in legal limbo or foster care drift. Cases too often did "fall through the
cracks."1 8 In fact, the West Virginia Supreme Court succinctly summarized the
problems facing the courts and the debate following the new revisions, even prior
to the revisions, when it stated, as early as 1991 that:

165

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)).

166

R. Bruce Dold, Giving Kids a Little More "Wiggle Room," CHI. TRiB., Dec 12,1997, at 27.

167

See generally Gordon, supra note 135.

168

See In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365 (W.Va. 1991).
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Certainly many delays are occasioned by the fact that troubled
human relationships and aggravated parenting problems are not
remedied overnight.
The law properly recognizes that rights of natural parents enjoy
a great deal of protection and that one of the primary goals of
the social services network and the courts is to give aid to
parents and children in an effort to reunite them. The bulk of
the most aggravating procedural delays, however, are
occasioned less by the complexities of mending broken people
and relationships than by the tendency of these types of cases
to fall through the cracks in the system. The long procedural
delays in this and most other abuse and neglect cases
considered by this Court in the last decade indicate that neither
the lawyers nor the courts are doing an adequate job of assuring
that children - the most voiceless segment of our society aren't left to languish in a limbo-like state during a time most
crucial to their human development. 69
These are the types of cases the revisions attempt to remedy. As the critics
note, there will be some circumstances in which parents simply do not have the
time to solve the multiple, complex problems which may afflict their troubled
households. 170 There will be cases in which judges must terminate the parental
rights of parents who have demonstrated some improvement. 171 However,
realistically, the goal of the West Virginia statutory provisions and procedural rules
is not, and never has been, to reunite all families. Instead, the State has recognized
that the most important principle that it should follow involves protecting the
welfare of its children.172 As is evident from the changes in West Virginia law in
1996, and the ASFA just one year later, the lines in child welfare law are being
redrawn. This effort involves providing all children with a safe, nurturing and
permanent home.1 73 Moreover, it involves doing so in a fair, timely, and efficient
manner.1 74 The new rules and statutory provisions take a step in the right direction
to reaching this goal. Proceedings under both the state and federal statutory changes
now focus more directly on the child's right to permanency and a permanency
arrived at in a timely fashion.
It is recognized that circuit court judges have "an immensely difficult task"
169

Id. at 375.

170

See Wilson, supra note 106.

171

See generally McCarthy, supranote 47.

172

See In re Katie S., 479 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1996).

173

See Munster, supra note 58.

174

See Workman, supra note 116.
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in sitting to decide upon the possible termination of parental rights in these child
abuse and neglect cases.175 The new revisions of improvement periods will
certainly limit some decisions that these trial judges are able to make. 76
Importantly, it should be noted that a judge's discretion has not been entirely lost.
Trial courts have considerable flexibility and discretion in structuring a
"meaningful improvement period designed to address the myriad possible problems
causing abuse and neglect." '7 These same courts have almost complete discretion
on a judgment of whether an improvement period has proven successful.1 78 This is
true "whether or not the individual has completed all suggestions or goals set forth
in family case plans. 17 9
The new revisions simply require these trial judges to give child abuse and
neglect proceedings the priority and importance they deserve. The new revisions
force courts to confront the difficult issues of abuse and neglect and force judges to
make the difficult decisions they all too often are trying to avoid in granting
improvement periods and extensions to these periods.180 Just as importantly, the
new statutory provisions and rules will require the courts, agencies and attorneys
involved to spend a great deal of additional time and labor in processing each
case.181 This additional time, albeit spent within a shorter time frame, should help
assure all those involved in the process that "no abuse and neglect case will ever
again "fall through the cracks." '182 Furthermore, the current law should help assure
that each child "will be permanently placed ina safe and secure environment,
within a reasonable time period, subsequent to the initiation of the case."'" This
certainly could not be said for many of the cases arising prior to the 1996 revisions.
The question is whether the 1996 revisions are an improvement on
improvement periods. The long-term outcomes have yet to be decided. However,
the structure and the process which these new "improvements" implement, at the
very least, set forth a process directed at placing the welfare and interests of
children at the forefront of child abuse and neglect jurisprudence in West Virginia.
Under the present law, the goals and aspirations of the State and the reality present
in West Virginia are, at least, closer in form and process. Again, this could not be
said about West Virginia child abuse and neglect law prior to 1996.
Children will certainly still fall through the cracks of a legal system which,
at times, leaves them in legal limbo. However, West Virginia's Legislature and
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State Supreme Court have worked hard to close these cracks and eliminate the
procedural delays that all too often wreak havoc on the lives of the most innocent
and voiceless segment of our society.' 84 The recent West Virginia revisions, as well
as the ASFA, offer an opportunity for committed individuals to overcome the
"cracks" in the system. The lofty goals set by these new laws will require those in
the courts and agencies to renew their efforts to protect abused and neglected
children. The changes in improvement periods are just one step in this process. It is,
however, an important step and a step which should prove extremely beneficial to
the abused and neglected children of West Virginia. These changes set a foundation
upon which West Virginia may work to continue to improve upon its efforts to
protect our children. In these efforts, West Virginia's children do appear to be very
fortunate. The West Virginia Supreme Court and lawmakers have "demonstrated
exceptional leadership" in the battle to assure the timely placement and safety of
abused and neglected children.1 85 This leadership is illustrated as The Rules of
Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings are "the first of its kind in the
nation and places West Virginia in the forefront of the nationwide effort" to
improve services for protecting children in child abuse and neglect cases.lM6 As
West Virginia enters the twenty-first century it must continue to build upon these
"improvements" in order to ensure that all children in West Virginia are able to live
in safe, stable and permanent homes.
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